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The philosophy of mathematics since Frege has been dominated by an oscil-
lation between Platonism and nominalism. 
Frege and many later authors defended a Platonist view of the reality of the 
“abstract objects” of mathematics such as numbers and sets,1 while nominalists 
tried to show that mathematics as applied in science can do without reference 
to such objects.2
To pose the problem in those terms neglects the Aristotelian option: that 
mathematics may be about some real properties of the (physical and/or non-
physical) world, such as its quantitative properties, or its symmetry, continuity, 
structure or pattern. Such a view is neither Platonist (since those properties are 
not in an “abstract” world but realised or at least realisable in the actual world, 
and in simple cases are perceivable) nor nominalist (since those properties are 
real aspects of things). Despite some Aristotelian currents in certain authors, 
there is no recognised complete Aristotelian option or school in the philosophy 
of mathematics.3
1   Notable recent examples include S. Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); J. R. Brown, Philosophy of Mathematics: An introduction to the 
world of proofs and pictures (London: Routledge, 1999); M. Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
2   H. Field, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980); J. Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence: a case for nominalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).
3   A preliminary eﬀ ort in J. Franklin, “Aristotelian realism”, in The Philosophy of Mathematics, 
ed. A. Irvine (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science series, Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier, 
2009), 101–153. Other works with Aristotelian tendencies include J. Bigelow, The Reality of Numbers: 
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An Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics, if it can be sustained, promises to 
remedy several notable defects in the philosophy of mathematics. First, there is 
the neglect of applied mathematics,4 since both Platonism and nominalism make 
it hard to see how mathematics can be so successful in real-world applications. 
Second, there is the confl ict between ontology and epistemology in mathematics, 
with Platonism taking the well-known objectivity of mathematics seriously but 
leaving it mysterious how we can access objects in another world, and nominal-
ism making epistemology easy but making the objectivity and applicability of 
ma the matics a mystery.5 The neglect of epistemology accounts for two strange 
absences in the philosophy of mathematics: understanding (and mathematics 
is where one fi rst goes to experience pure understanding) and measurement 
(the primary way in which mathematics joins to the world). Thirdly, there is 
the divorce between the philosophy of mathematics, on the one hand, and de-
velopmental psychology and mathematics education, on the other – surely the 
considerable knowledge of infants’ mathematical learning6 should be compatible 
with the correct philosophy of mathematics?
An Aristotelian realism shows obvious promise of resolving these tensions, 
by exhibiting real properties of things that can be the objects of learning in 
children, the objects of understanding in adults, and the basis of the applications 
of applied mathematics.
The fi rst task of an Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics is to achieve clar-
ity as to what properties of the real world, exactly, are the objects of mathematics. 
A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988); J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Science 
and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 2; P. Forrest and D. M. Armstrong, 
“The nature of number”, Philosophical Papers 16 (1987): 165–186; A. D. Irvine, ed., Physicalism in 
Mathematics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990); P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); 
T. Wilholt, Zahl und Wirklichkeit: Eine philosophische Untersuchung über die Anwendbarkeit der Mathematik 
(Paderborn: Mentis, 2004).
4   Noted in S. Körner, The Philosophy of Mathematics: An introductory essay (London: Hutchinson, 
1960) and M. Steiner, The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1998).
5   Noted in P. Benacerraf, “Mathematical truth”, Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661–679; nominalist 
answers include G. Hellman, Mathematics Without Numbers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) and M. Leng, 
Mathematics and Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Platonist answers include R. C. Koons, 
Realism Regained (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 15.
6   S. Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the mind creates mathematics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); Z. P. Dienes, Building Up Mathematics (London: Hutchinson, 1960), esp. ch. 2; A. Baroody, 
M.-L. Lai and K. S. Mix, “The development of young children’s early number and operation sense and its 
implications for early childhood education”, in Handbook of Research on the Education of Young Children, 
ed. B. Spodek and O. N. Saracho, 2nd ed. (Mahwah Ǌ : Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), ch. 11; comment in 
P. Kitcher, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 107–8.
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There is an old answer to this question, namely “quantity”, which remains partly 
true but requires some supplementation.
“THE SCIENCE OF QUANTITY”
From the time of Aristotle to the eighteenth century, one philosophy of 
mathematics dominated the fi eld. Mathematics, it was said, is the “science of 
quantity”. Quantity is of two kinds, discrete and continuous, studied respectively 
by arithmetic and geometry.
Aristotle not only provided the general metaphysical  amework of non-
Platonist realism but laid down a number of themes specifi c to mathematics. 
Mathematics was for him a study of properties of physical things, abstracted 
 om them only in thought:
Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces, volumes, lines and points, and 
these are the subject-matter of mathematics … the mathematician does not 
consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of physical bodies. That 
is why he separates them, for in thought they are separable  om motion … 
While geometry investigates physical lengths, but not as physical, [the more 
physical branch of mathematics,] optics, investigates mathematical lengths, 
but as physical.7
The contrast of this realism with Platonism is explicit: “mathematical objects 
exist and are as they are said to be”, but they are not separate objects. “There 
are attributes peculiar to animals as being male or as being female (yet there is 
no male or female separate  om animals). So there are properties holding true 
of things merely as lengths or as planes.”8
 Aristotle also laid out the basic distinction between discrete and continuous 
quantity, along with the resemblance between them in their both referring to 
divisibility into parts:
“Quantum” means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts 
of which each is by nature a “one” and a “this”. A quantum is a plurality if it 
is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. “Plurality” means that which 
7   Aristotle, Physics II, 2, 193 b 23–194a11, discussed in J. Lear, “Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics”, 
Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 161–192; H. Mendell, “Aristotle and mathematics”, in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Summer 2004 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), url = 〈http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2004/entries/aristotle-mathematics/〉.
8   Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII, 3, 1077 b 18 – 1078 a 9.
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is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, “magnitude” that which is 
divisible into continuous parts.9
And on discrete quantity, he emphasized – if a little cryptically – the relati-
vity of number to the universal being used to divide the mass being counted 
into units:
“The one” means the measure of some plurality, and “number” means a mea-
sured plurality and a plurality of measures … The measure must always be 
some identical thing predicable of all the things it measures, e.g. if the things 
are horses, the measure is “horse”, and if they are men, “man”. If they are 
a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps “living being”, and the 
number of them will be a number of living beings.10
Likewise in continuous quantity, he noted the reliance of measurement on 
relation to the quantity we take for a unit: “…   measure means that by which 
each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit–in length, 
breadth, depth, weight and speed … In all these cases, then, the measure and 
starting-point is some indivisible unit (since even in the case of lines we treat the 
one-foot line as indivisible).”11 That is not to say that Aristotle takes quantity 
itself to be relative; simply that our knowledge or measurement of it must be 
relative to a unit.
By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a version of an Aristotelian 
theory of mathematics as a realist science of quantity, both discrete and continu-
ous, was standard.12 Newton writes of continuous quantity, in his characteristic 
magisterial style:
By Number we understand not so much a Multitude of Unities, as the ab-
stracted Ratio of any Quantity, to another Quantity of the same kind, which 
we take for Unity.13
9   Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 13, 1020 a 7 – 12.
10   Aristotle, Metaphysics Ⅺ V, 1, 1088 a 4–11; further in H. G. Apostle, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952); V. E. Smith, St Thomas on the Object of Geometry (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1954); D. Bostock, “Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics”, in Oxford 
Handbook on Aristotle, to appear.
11   Aristotle, Metaphysics X, 1, 1052 b 22–30.
12   E.g. I. Barrow, The Usefulness of Mathematical Learning Explained and Demonstrated (London, 
1734, repr. London: Cass, 1970), 10-15; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1st ed. (Edinburgh, 1771), article 
“Mathematics”, vol. III, 30–31; P. Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in 
the Seventeenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 16, 35–37, 56, 88; D. M. Jesseph, 
Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch. 1.
13   I. Newton, Arithmetica Univeralis (1728), 2; similar in L. Euler, Elements of Algebra, 3rd ed. (London, 
1822); both discussed in Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60–61.
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The realist quantity theory apparently then died of inanition. A version of it 
was defended by John Stuart Mill, but the criticisms of Mill made by Frege were 
generally thought to have ruled out any such realist theory.
The quantity theory plainly gives an initially reasonable picture of at least 
elementary mathematics, with its emphasis on counting, measuring, and calcu-
lating with the resulting numbers. It promises direct answers to questions about 
what the object of mathematics is (certain properties of physical and possibly 
non-physical things such as their size), and how those properties are known (the 
same way other natural properties of physical things are known – by perception 
in simple cases and inference  om perception in more complex ones). Let us 
examine quantity more closely  om a modern point of view.
QUANTITY: CONTINUOUS QUANTITY AND RATIOS
The division of quantity into continuous and discrete at least highlights the 
fact that it is far  om clear initially whether the two kinds have much in com-
mon, for example whether the ratio “the double” has much in common with the 
counting number 2. So let us examine them separately.
The crucial concept of continuous quantity is that of ratio or proportion. John 
Bigelow, one of the most Aristotelian of recent philosophers of mathematics, 
introduces ratios as follows. The Aristotelian language is chosen to keep close 
to physically real relations, and also to remind us how easily we deal with the 
reality of relations, and relations between relations:
Physical objects, like elephants and Italians, humming-birds and Hottentots, 
have many physical properties and relations: volume and surface area, for 
example. And the physical properties of these objects stand in important 
relations to one another. In particular, such physical properties stand in rela-
tions of proportion to one another. There is a relation between the surface 
area of the humming-bird and that of the Hottentot; and this may or may 
not be the same as the relationship that holds between the surface areas of 
an Italian and an elephant.
Relationships such as proportion will hold not only between surface areas 
but also between volumes. Conceivably, the relationship between the surface 
areas of two objects might be the same as the relationship between volumes 
for two other objects. But it is a fact of considerable biological signifi cance 
that the relation between surface areas of two objects will not, in general, 
be the same as the relationship between their volumes. Ignoring diﬀ erences 
in shape (say, by supposing an elephant were shaped like an Italian, or vice 
versa), it turns out that if the elephant has ten times the height then it will 
have a hundred times the surface area and a thousand times the volume. The 
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volumes of the elephant and the Italian, or the Hottentot and the humming-
bird, will be “more diﬀ erent” than their surface areas. There are several 
distinct relationships present; furthermore, there are distinctive ways in 
which these relationships diﬀ er  om one another. There are also distinctive 
relationships among these relationships. These facts have consequences of 
physical signifi cance: for instance, with regard to problems of heat regulation. 
It is  om such fertile soil as this that most of mathematics has grown.14
Thus for example the universal “being 1.57 kilograms in mass” stands in 
a certain relation, a ratio, to the universal “being 0.35 kilograms in mass”. Pairs 
of lengths can stand in that same ratio, as can pairs of time intervals. The ratio 
itself is just what those binary relations between pairs of masses, lengths and 
time intervals have in common (“A ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size 
between two magnitudes of the same kind”: Euclid, book V, defi nition 3). Thus 
there are determinate relations such as “being one-third the volume of ” that 
hold between physical objects, and then there are “topic-neutral” ratios which 
are relations between those determinate relations – for example, the ratio 3 : 2 
holds between “being three times as massive as” and “being twice as massive as”.15
The theory of the ancients that the science of continuous quantity is ge-
ometry does need some qualifi cation. It was always hard to regard shape as 
straightforwardly “quantity” – it contrasts with size, rather than resembling 
it – though geometry certainly studies it. Further, there is an alternative body 
of knowledge with a better claim to being the science of continuous quantity 
in general, namely, the calculus. Stemming  om Aristotelian debates on the 
continuum,16 the study of continuity requires the notion of a limit, as described 
and made use of in the diﬀ erential calculus of Newton and Leibniz, and made 
more rigorous in the real analysis of Cauchy and Weierstrass.
MEASUREMENT AND THE APPLICABILITY OF MATHEMATICS
As a case study on what such an Aristotelian perspective on (continuous) 
quantity can do, we present recent realist work on measurement theory.
14   J. Bigelow, “Sets are haecceities”, in Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D. M. 
Armstrong, ed. J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
ch. 4, at 74–75.
15   D. M. Armstrong, “Are quantities relations? A reply to Bigelow and Pargetter”, Philosophical 
Studies 54 (1988): 305-316.
16   A. Newstead, “Aristotle and Modern Mathematical Theories of the Continuum”, in Aristotle 
and Contemporary Science II, ed. D. Sfendoni-Mentzou, J. R. Brown and J. Hattiangadi (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2001), 113-129.
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Nowhere is the divergence between the Aristotelian and Platonist standpoints 
more obvious than in how they approach the problem of the applicability of 
mathematics. That very description of the problem has a Platonist bias, as if 
the problem is about the relations between “abstract” mathematical entities and 
something distinct  om them in the “world” to which they are “applied”. On 
an Aristotelian view, there is no such initial separation between mathematics 
and its “applications”, since the quantity, symmetry, continuity and so on that 
pure mathematics studies is the same symmetry and continuity that is found in 
the physical world.
That undesirable assumed split between mathematical entities and their 
“applications” is fi rst evident in accounts of measurement. Considering the fun-
damental importance of measurement as the fi rst point of contact between math-
ematics and what it is about, it is surprising how little attention has been paid 
to it in the standard literature of the philosophy of mathematics. What work 
there has been has tended to concentrate on “representation theorems” that de-
scribe the conditions under which quantities can be represented by numbers.17 
“Measurement theory oﬃ  cially takes homomorphisms of empirical domains into 
(intended) models of mathematical systems as its subject matter”, as one recent 
writer expresses it.18 That again poses the problem as if it is one about the as-
sociation of numbers to parts of the world, which inevitably leads to a Platonist 
perspective on the problem.
But a closer look suggests an Aristotelian reinterpretation. What is it about 
the quantitative properties of the measured world that ensures that a homomor-
phism to numbers exists? The standard treatment (of measurement of length) 
begins by looking at the properties of concatenating identical rods, and axioma-
tising those properties as a basis for showing that the homomorphism exists.19 
But the quantitative properties exist prior to the homomorphism and are the 
condition of its existence: as the Aristotelian maintains, the system of ratios 
of lengths, for example, pre-exists in the physical things being measured, and 
measurement consists in identi ing the ratios that are of interest in a particular 
case; the arbitrary choice of unit that allows ratios to be converted to digital 
17   E.g. C. W. Savage and P. Ehrlich, Philosophical and Foundational Issues in Measurement Theory 
(Hillsdale, Ǌ : L. Erlbaum, 1992).
18   Azzouni, Defl ating Existential Consequence, 161.
19   D. H. Krantz, R. D. Luce, P. Suppes and A. Tversky, Foundations of Measurement, vol. 1 (New 
York: Academic, 1971), ch. 1.
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numerals for ease of calculation is something that happens at the last step.20 
That in turn suggests an Aristotelian realist view of the real numbers arising in 
measurement. As the Australian Aristotelian Michell puts it, in language similar 
to that used of ratios above:
The commitment that measurable attributes sustain ratios has a further 
implication, viz., that the real numbers are spatiotemporally located relations. 
It commits us to a realist view of number. If Smith’s weight is 90 kg, then 
this is equivalent to asserting that the real number, 90, is a kind of relation, 
viz., the kind of relation holding between Smith’s weight and the weight 
of the standard kilogram. Since these weights are real, spatiotemporally 
located instances of the attribute, any relation holding between them will 
likewise be real and spatiotemporally located. This kind of relation is what 
was referred to above as a ratio. So the realist view of measurement implies 
that real numbers are ratios. By way of contrast, the standard view within the 
philosophy of mathematics is that numbers are abstract entities of some kind, 
entities not intrinsic to the empirical context of measurement, but related 
externally to features of that situation by human convention. This neatly fi ts 
the representational view of measurement and in the 20th century, the repre-
sentational view has dominated philosophical thinking about measurement. 
The representational view was strongly informed by non-realist thinking 
within the philosophy of mathematics.21
QUANTITY: DISCRETE QUANTITY, NUMBERS AND SETS
Discrete quantities arise in quite a diﬀ erent way  om ratios. It is characteristic 
of “unit-making” or “count” universals like “being an apple” or “being a horse” 
(in Aristotle’s example) to structure their instances discretely. That is what dis-
tinguishes them  om mass universals like “being water”. A heap of apples stands 
in a certain relation to “being an apple”. That relation is the number of apples 
in the heap. The same relation can hold between a heap of shoes and “being 
a shoe”. The number is just what these binary relations have in common.22
Thus, suppose there are seven black swans on the lake now. The proposition 
refers to a part of the world, the black biomass on the lake, and a structuring 
20   Similar comments in Bigelow and Pargetter, Science and Necessity, 60–61.
21   J. Michell, “The logic of measurement: a realist overview”, Measurement 38 (2005): 285–294; 
relation to Aristotle discussed in C. B. Crowley, Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Measure and the 
International System of Units (SI) (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1996).
22   From D. M. Armstrong, Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), ch. 13; originally  om P. Forrest and D. M. Armstrong, “The nature of number”, Philosophical 
Papers 16 (1987): 165–186; and mostly in G. Kessler, “Frege, Mill and the foundations of arithmetic”, 
Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 65–79.
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property, being a black swan on the lake now. Both are necessary to determining 
that the relation between the mass and the property should be “seven”: if it were 
a diﬀ erent mass (e.g. the black swans on or beside the lake) or a diﬀ erent unit-
making property (e.g. being a swan organ on the lake now) then the numerical 
relation would be diﬀ erent. Therefore numbers are not properties of parts of the 
world simply, but must be properties of the relation between parts of the world 
and the unit-making properties that structure them.
So the fact that the heap of shoes stands in one such numerical relation to 
“being a shoe” and another numerical relation to “being a pair of shoes” (made 
much of by Frege23) does not show that the number of a heap is subjective, or 
not about something in the world, but only that number is relative to the count 
universal being considered. For Aristotelians, the universal is real and so is its 
relation to the heap it structures.
Whereas ratios have nothing to do with sets, numbers are intimately con-
nected with them. Given a set, there is something to count. And conversely, if 
there is counting, there is a set of entities being counted, and indeed sets are good 
for little else. Given a heap and a unit-making property structuring it, there is 
immediately created (there supervenes) both the set of things of which the heap 
is the mereological sum, and a number of things in that set. If there is no unit-
making property – if there is just stuﬀ  – there is no number and no set. If there 
is a unit-making property, there is a set and a number of elements in the set.
So what are sets,  om an Aristotelian point of view? The Aristotelian can-
not rest content with the Platonist story that sets are a simple Platonist entity 
at which questions should stop, and that the membership relation is sui generis. 
That conception is problematic, but even if it were intelligible and satisfactory, 
it would interpose a Platonist entity in a story where there should be no role 
for it, the story of how unit-making properties structure a heap into something 
able to be counted.
The Aristotelian desires a theory according to which sets are ontologically 
nothing over and above there being a unit-making property to structure a heap. 
Several closely-related theories are available. The leading one is that of David 
Armstrong. He adopts David Lewis’s proposal that a set is the mereological 
sum of its singletons, and adds the idea that the singleton of x is simply the 
23   G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), trans. J. L. Austin, 2nd revised ed. (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1980), § 22, p. 28 and § 54, p. 66.
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state of aﬀ airs of there being some unit-making universal that singles out x.24 
The essence of the suggestion is that at the basic philosophical level necessary 
in these questions, we cannot help ourselves naively to the notion of “object”. 
When we assert “The cat sat on the mat”, “The”, in “the cat”, indicates that we 
are dealing with a single unifi ed object, cut out  om the background. In the ap-
parent continuum of matter that is the universe and the fl ux it undergoes, what 
cuts out the single warm furry item, draws its boundaries and points it out as an 
individual thing deserving a common noun?25 It is the property, the repeatable 
unit-making property “being a cat”, that cuts the cat  om the background, and 
in doing so creates a singleton (and when actually repeated creates other sets) 
and at the same time creates something to be counted.
This view of sets raises the possibility that small sets of physical objects 
should be directly perceivable, as argued by Maddy.26 If I open an egg carton 
and see that there are three eggs in it, I perceive both the pale curved surface of 
the egg-heap and that it is structured by “being an egg” into three parts, each 
an egg. That is suﬃ  cient to perceive the heap as a set of three eggs.
Perception of sets of sets of physical objects is not beyond our capabilities 
either. For example, in this diagram,
Fig. 1
Why 2 × 3 = 3 × 2
the point of the ovals is to guide the visual system so as to see the six objects 
as alternately two sets of triples and three sets of pairs. That is what allows the 
intellect to grasp the relation between the parts and hence achieve its certain 
24   D. M. Armstrong, “Classes are states of aﬀ airs”, Mind 100 (1991): 189-200; several proposals listed 
in A. Paseau, “Motivating reductionism about sets”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 295–307.
25   B. C. Smith, On the Origin of Objects (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996).
26   P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, 58–67.
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knowledge of the equation 2 × 3 = 3 × 2, based on its understanding of why it 
must be so.
“THE SCIENCE OF STRUCTURE”
It became clear that, even if the “science of quantity” theory were correct 
about elementary mathematics, it was not adequate to cover some of the subject-
matters of modern higher mathematics. A contemporary Aristotelian philosophy 
of mathematics must expand its view of the objects of mathematics.
The earliest case of a serious mathematical problem that seemed clearly not 
well described as being about “quantity” was Euler’s example of the bridges of 
Königsberg. The bridges connected two islands and two riverbanks as shown 
in the diagram.
Fig. 2
The bridges of Königsberg
The citizens of Königsberg in the eighteenth century noticed that it was 
impossible to walk over all the bridges once, without walking over at least one of 
them twice. Euler proved they were correct.27 The result is intuitively about the 
“arrangement” or pattern of the bridges, rather than about anything quantita-
tive like size or number. As Euler puts it, the result is “concerned only with the 
determination of position and its properties; it does not involve measurements.” 
The length of the bridges and the size of the islands are irrelevant. That is why 
we can draw the diagram so schematically. All that matters is which land masses 
are connected by which bridges. Euler’s result is now regarded as the pioneering 
eﬀ ort in the topology of networks. There now exist large bodies of work on 
such topics as graph theory, networks, and operations research problems like 
timetabling, where the emphasis is on arrangements and connections rather 
than quantities.
27   L. Euler, “Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentis” (1776), trans. in Graph Theory 
1736–1936, ed. N. Biggs, E. Lloyd and R. Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 3–8.
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A second kind of example where structure contrasts with quantity is sym-
metry, brought to the fore by nineteenth-century group theory and twentieth-
century physics. Symmetry is a real property of things, things which may be but 
need not be physical (an argument, for example, can have symmetry if its second 
half repeats the steps of the fi rst half in the opposite order; Platonist mathemati-
cal entities, if any existed, could be symmetrical). The kinds of symmetry are 
classifi ed by group theory, the central part of modern abstract algebra.28 
In the 1990s, there was a prominent “structuralist” school in the philosophy 
of mathematics, led by Resnik and Shapiro, which rightly highlighted the role 
of structure in mathematics.29 However they viewed structures as a Platonist 
entity similar to sets.
CONCLUSION
Platonists and nominalists have comprehensively exposed each others’ inad-
equacies in the philosophy of mathematics. The resources are now available for 
a revival of Aristotelian realism. It will not be in the strict Aristotelian tradition 
of the “science of quantity”, but will still be a moderate realist view, neither 
Platonist nor nominalist, which will include quantity in the subject-matter of 
mathematics.
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SUMMARIUM
De philosophia mathematicae Aristotelica
Philosophia mathematicae hodierna aut Platonismum, aut nominalismum amplectitur, rea-
lismo Aristotelico neglecto remanente. Secundum sententiam Aristotelicam mathematica circa 
formas seu rationes, quae vere in rebus reperiuntur, agit. Mathematica ergo non versatur 
circa “obiecta abstracta” incorporea, ut Platonici volunt, nec est mera “lingua scientiarum”, 
ut nominalistae docent. Sententia Aristotelis, mathematicam scil. esse “scientiam quantitatis”, 
ad minimum arithmeticae elementaris indolem bene exprimit. Ratio nempe seu proportio e. g. 
duarum altitudinum est perceptibilis mensurabilisque relatio realis inter duas formas a parte 
rei repertas. In eadem proportione quoque duo pondera aut intervalla temporis convenire pos-
sunt. Proportio seu ratio est exemplar quantitatis continuae; sed etiam quantitates discretae, 
ut numeri integri, sunt relationes, videlicet multitudinis ad universale, quod unitatem defi nit. 
Numerus e. g. foliorum arboris est relatio frondis ad “folium-esse”; quae relatio aequalis esse 
potest relationi, quam multitudo caligarum dicit ad “caligam-esse”. Sublimior mathematica 
hodierna autem circa formas quandas reales, quae naturaliter non videntur esse quantitates, 
versatur; quapropter defi nitio mathe matices ut “scientiae quantitatis” laxari debere videtur. 
Symmetria, topologia et similia sunt obiectum mathematices, non tamen praecise dicunt 
quantitatem, sed potius structuram, ordinem, dispositionem partium in toto etc.
ABSTRACT
Aristotelianism in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Modern philosophy of mathematics has been dominated by Platonism and nominalism, to the 
neglect of the Aristotelian realist option. Aristotelianism holds that mathematics studies certain 
real properties of the world – mathematics is neither about a disembodied world of “abstract ob-
jects”, as Platonism holds, nor it is merely a language of science, as nominalism holds. Aristotle’s 
theory that mathematics is the “science of quantity” is a good account of at least elementary 
mathematics: the ratio of two heights, for example, is a perceivable and measurable real relation 
between properties of physical things, a relation that can be shared by the ratio of two weights 
or two time intervals. Ratios are an example of continuous quantity; discrete quantities, such 
as whole numbers, are also realised as relations between a heap and a unit-making universal. 
For example, the relation between foliage and being-a-leaf is the number of leaves on a tree, 
a relation that may equal the relation between a heap of shoes and being-a-shoe. Modern higher 
mathematics, however, deals with some real properties that are not naturally seen as quantity, 
so that the “science of quantity” theory of mathematics needs supplementation. Symmetry, 
topology and similar structural properties are studied by mathematics, but are about pattern, 
structure or arrangement rather than quantity.
